# Shamoon UDURRANI

I am not getting into all the details this time. I just want to cover the flow and IOC's of this payload. If you want to look at the previous shamoon report, please google Robert Falcone's report.

Here is the flow, I named the payload as shamoon.exe



As you can see above, it drops 2 payloads. The names are given randomly to these payloads. Names are within the payload (encrypted). Here is the list of all names

mmotsml q140xx23 netavpntt setupapiev23 ks25 mdmtexasr prntsa02 mdmnttr mdmnovb **MSDTCB** netpgm1 prN2rC00b mdmcxavu mdmbr43 wOaky032 mdm2mcom hdBaudio dc21G4vm

winntusb3 mdm2bt2mdm wvm2bus2video faxcnnumber mdmmhzell mdmg1908 netnbdrve prnod802 netrndiscnt netrtl421 mdmadccnt prnca00 bth2bht\_ibv32 cxfalcon\_ibL32 mdmsupr30 digitalmediadevicectl mdmetech2dmv netb57vxx winwsdprint prnkwy005 composite005 mdmar1\_ibv32 prnle444 kscaptur\_ibv32 mdmzyxlga usbvideob input\_ibv48 prnok002\_ibv averfx2swtvZ wpdmtp\_ibv32 mdmti\_ibv32 printupg\_ibv32 wiabr788 \_wialx002 \_\_wiaca00a tsprint\_ibv acpipmi2z prnlx00ctl prngt6\_4 arcx6u0 \_tdibth prncaz90x mdmgcs\_8 mdmusrk1g5 netbxndxlg2 prnsv0\_56 af0038bdax averfix2h826d\_noaverir megasasop hidirkbdmvs2 vsmxraid mdamx\_5560 wiacnt7001

Stage 1 payload has the kill-time set to **20171272351 i.e. 2017-12-7 23:51.** This will make it execute on pretty much any machine.

File **netnbdrve.exe** is used for C2 channel, while **mdamx\_5560** is used to drop the driver, wipe and shut down the machine. Payload, used for C2 channel has all the code to communicate to a C2 but its not really active. It does the following:

- Opens an handle to C:\Windows\inf\**averbh\_noav.pnf** via CreateFileW(). If the return value is **INVALID\_HANDLE\_VALUE**, it sleeps for another 5000 milliSeconds. If it returns a valid handle, it will use

```
BOOL ReadFile(
HANDLE hFile,
LPVOID lpBuffer,
DWORD nNumberOfBytesToRead,
LPDWORD lpNumberOfBytesRead,
LPOVERLAPPED lpOverlapped
);
```

So e.g. if the handle returned from **CreateFileW**() is **0x00000154**, that will be provided to **ReadFile**(). **Hanlde** is a kernel object. Its just a pointer in OS memory space that you are not allowed to use directly. File **averbh\_noav.pnf** keeps the wiping status. This loop continues every 5 seconds i.e. 5000 milliSeconds. In this particular payload this file is useless.

File mdamx\_5560 is used to conduct the wiper activity. Here are the commands.

mdamx\_5560.exe 1 C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c sc stop hdv\_725x 2>&1 >nul sc stop hdv\_725x C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c sc delete hdv\_725x 2>&1 >nul sc delete hdv\_725x C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c sc create hdv\_725x type= kernel start= demand binpath= C:\Windows\hdv\_725x.sys 2>&1 >nul C:\Windows\system32\nethbdrve.exe 1 sc create hdv\_725x type= kernel start= demand binpath= C:\Windows\hdv\_725x.sys C:\Windows\system32\nethbdrve.exe 1 sc create hdv\_725x type= kernel start= demand binpath= C:\Windows\hdv\_725x.sys C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c sc start hdv\_725x 2>&1 >nul sc start hdv\_725x

And eventually:

C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c shutdown -r -f -t 2

# There are 2 drivers dropped:



The .sys file is called **hdv\_725x.sys**. Payload **mdamx\_5560** will first delete this sys file CreateProcessA ( "C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe", "C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c sc delete hdv\_725x 2>&1 >nul", NULL, NULL, TRUE, 0, NULL, NULL, ... )

And then create it

sc create hdv\_725x type= kernel start= demand binpath= C:\Windows\hdv\_725x.sys

File hdv\_725x.sys is the actual driver used, here is the actual hash

## 92 ff f1 d754 fa a b 445 e 90651 d fb 0 d e d 4 d

Its using version 2.1.27.106, name elrawdsk.sys.

**This driver Allows write access to files and raw disk sectors for user mode applications** Installation of the driver requires *admin privileges*. Remember, this is a signed sys file.

************	
[0032FAF8]->	(null)
[0032FB0C1->	GlobalSign ObjectSign CA
[0032FB10]->	EldoS Corporation
[0032FAFC1->	(null)
[0032FB001->	(null)
[00FE2180]->	01 00 00 00 00 01 26 1d ec 28 f7

Once the driver is installed, the driver can provide the ability to write and read sector by sector, access to locked files and access to rawDisk. First stage uses *NtCreateFile* to drop the sysFile.

**NtCreateFile** (PHANDLE, FILE\_READ\_ATTRIBUTES | GENERIC\_WRITE | SYNCHRONIZE, ObjectAttributes, IoStatusBlock, NULL, FILE\_ATTRIBUTE\_NORMAL, FILE\_SHARE\_READ, FILE\_OVERWRITE\_IF, FILE\_NON\_DIRECTORY\_FILE | FILE\_SYNCHRONOUS\_IO\_NONALERT, NULL, 0) Let's look at the MBR overwrite in the following picture. The payload overwrites the MBR with random data. All the files are encrypted as well. Eldos driver makes sure that the files with already open handles get infected as well. This will cause a blue screen followed by No OS found screen. There is no message or image embedded in there. Its all about destruction.



In the past, e.g. shamoon 2, MBR was overwritten with an image. Here is how the MBR looked like after the overwrite. In the following picture, MBR is shown in color and the header information is shown in gray.

ffd8ffe 1000000 ef10fec 1f1f1f1 0000000 536334f 0fd2f28	10184 00000 13131 f1f1f 00123 17335 3b4be	5786 0000 4141 1f1f 4561 4425 9525	966 00f .313 1f1 .002 17c 229	0049 fee0 1c1b f1f1 1331 2d28 0397	492 e41 1b1 f1f 644 393 1ad	a08 646 b1c 1f1 436 541 48c	000 f62 1f1 f1f 442 811 685	000 650 f1f 1ff b12 022 d56	000 64c 1f1 fc0 301 222 81b	00f 000 f1f 011 142 221 65d	fec 01f: 1f1: 824: 112: 342: 5f4:	0114 Edb0 E1E1 12bc 5314 2310 294c	475 840 f17 311 151 011 44e	636b7901040003c00ffed02c50686f746f73686f7020332e3003842494d42500000 644454655695659b866Bbcaabaacl0ccccccl0c 77dcd181010181a15111541f1f1f1f1f1f1f1f1f1f1f1f1f1f1f1f1
1														
N														
N														
- N														
× 1	***				DT									
- N.	TTAT'	H.Gr.		LEiA	DE	5 .PL								
	4													
000000	FF D8	FF	E1	00 18	45	78	69	66	00	00	49 4	9 2A	00	ExifII*.
000010	08 00	00	00	00 00	00	00	00	00	00	00 1	FF E	C 00	11	
000020	44 75	63	6B	79 00	01	00	04	00	00	00	3C 0	0 00	FF	Ducky
000030	ED 00	2C	50	68 6I	74	6F	73	68	6F	70 :	20 3	3 2E	30	,Photoshop 3.0
000040	00 38	42	49	4D 04	25	00	00	00	00	00	10 0	0 00	00	.8BIM.%
000050	00 00	00	00	00 00	00	00	00	00	00	00	00 F	F EE	00	
000060	0E 41	64	6F	62 65	5 00	64	C0	00	00	00	01 F	F DB	00	.Adobe.d

### **Encryption**:

Yes, its encrypting the MBR and files with a key called **key8854321.pub**. Its a public key. Here is the hash

41f8cd9ac3fb6b1771177e5770537518

#### **Conclusion:**

Payload has kill-time set to 2017, this means it will run on any machine as the kill-time is already passed. Think of kill-time as a logic-bomb that will detonate when time >= (time provide by the attacker). Previous shamoon was designed for a specific victim. This means it wont propagate on any other network, since the credentials are hardcoded within the payload. On the other hand, this payload can work independently but it does need another stage that will carry it to other machines i.e. propagation / lateral movement.

#### IOC's

b41f586fc9c95c66f0967f1592641a85 887c614608e7cd9a691858caf468c28f 41f8cd9ac3fb6b1771177e5770537518 92fff1d754faab445e90651dfb0ded4d de07c4ac94a50663851e5dabe6e50d1f a4a9100413ebba59cab785d506448093

You can get the driver names from above. For info on previous shamoon go to

http://udurrani.com/0fff/s00.pdf http://udurrani.com/0fff/h8.html https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Bg6ia1FWrqw&t=2s https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UEOghELxfmo