

SUMMARY

There are several malicious payloads that affect the MBR and MFT of a machine. Recently we noticed WanaCry, Petya / NotPetya. HDDCryptor (AKA Mamba) is one of those payloads. However its different in a way as it carries a Full Disk Encryption program that encrypts the disk and locks a user out at boot. Disk encryption used is commercially available as well. Shamoon also used a commercially available RawDisk driver developed by EldoS Corporation.

Let's look at the flow

- First stage consists of a 32 bit binary that requires admin credentials to function properly
- Admin credentials are obtained either via keyLogger, maybe Brute-forced or by leveraging an exploit. However I didn't notice any exploit code path.
- It drops multiple executables including DLL's
- It creates a service
- MBR is replaced with a custom one.
- Machine is rebooted
- Custom MBR shows the ransom message


Malware was recently found in Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

HDDCRYPTOR / MAMBA

PAYLOAD

First stage is a 32 bit executable that drops multiple components under **C:\DC22**

```
|—DC22  
| |—dcapi.dll  
| |—dccon.exe  
| |—dcinst.exe  
| |—dcrypt.exe  
| |—dcrypt.sys  
| |—log_file.txt  
| |—Mount.exe  
| |—netpass.exe
```



Payload doesn't require internet connection. It drops all the files without using the internet. On execution user gets an elevation prompt. It spawns itself and then creates a service.

The screenshot shows a Windows Task Manager window with the following process list:

Time	Process Name	PID	Parent PID	Parent Name	Process Name
[07-16-2017-19-45-48]	cmd.exe	3564	PARENT	3344	procCommand.exe
[07-16-2017-19-46-31]	dllhost.exe	2548	PARENT	604	svchost.exe
[07-16-2017-19-46-34]	wTemp.exe	3120	PARENT	2812	explorer.exe
*** C:\Users\foo\Desktop\wTemp.exe					
WIN-RN4A1D7IM6L, wTemp.exe, "C:\Users\foo\Desktop\wTemp.exe", 3120					
[07-16-2017-19-46-34]	conhost.exe	3524	PARENT	392	csrss.exe
[07-16-2017-19-46-45]	consent.exe	864	PARENT	960	svchost.exe
[07-16-2017-19-46-47]	dllhost.exe	204	PARENT	604	svchost.exe
[07-16-2017-19-46-47]	dllhost.exe	2996	PARENT	604	svchost.exe
[07-16-2017-19-46-47]	cmd.exe	2680	PARENT	2812	explorer.exe
[07-16-2017-19-46-47]	conhost.exe	1092	PARENT	392	csrss.exe
[07-16-2017-19-47-09]	PAYLOAD.exe	1388	PARENT	2680	cmd.exe
[07-16-2017-19-47-39]	PAYLOAD.exe	3812	PARENT	1388	(null)
[07-16-2017-19-47-39]	conhost.exe	1932	PARENT	392	csrss.exe
[07-16-2017-19-47-54]	cmd.exe	3736	PARENT	3812	PAYLOAD.exe
[07-16-2017-19-47-54]	schtasks.exe	2016	PARENT	3736	cmd.exe
[07-16-2017-19-47-59]	cmd.exe	3604	PARENT	3812	PAYLOAD.exe
[07-16-2017-19-47-59]	schtasks.exe	3992	PARENT	3604	cmd.exe
[07-16-2017-19-48-00]	cmd.exe	3880	PARENT	3812	PAYLOAD.exe

A red box highlights the PAYLOAD.exe process at PID 3812. A red arrow points to it from the text "BAD GUY" in the top right corner. A cartoon snake icon is also present in the top right corner.

COMMANDS FLOW

```
C:\DC22\dcinst.exe -setup
C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c schtasks /create /tn DefragmentService /TR "cmd.exe /c net use >> c:\dc22\netuse.txt" /sc DAILY
schtasks /create /tn DefragmentService /TR "cmd.exe /c net use >> c:\dc22\netuse.txt" /sc DAILY
C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c schtasks /run /TN DefragmentService
schtasks /run /TN DefragmentService
C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c schtasks /delete /TN DefragmentService /F
schtasks /delete /TN DefragmentService /F
C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c C:\DC22\netpass.exe /stab C:\DC22\netpass.txt
C:\DC22\netpass.exe /stab C:\DC22\netpass.txt
LogonUI.exe /flags:0x0 (REBOOT)
```

As you can see the flow, it does multiple things that includes creating service(s) followed by a reboot.

```
-> system\currentcontrolset\services\dcrypt"(R): 0
-> system\currentcontrolset\services\dcrypt\config"(R): 1
-> (T) 3
* [1] Flags 5
* [2] Hotkeys 7
* [3] sysBuild 8
-> system\currentcontrolset\services\dcrypt\Instances"(R): 1
-> system\currentcontrolset\services\dcrypt\Instances\dcrypt"(R): 2
-> (T) 2
* [1] Altitude 8
* [2] Flags 5
-> (T) 1
* [1] DefaultInstance 15
-> system\currentcontrolset\services\dcrypt\Enum"(R): 1
-> (T) 4
* [1] 0 1
* [2] Count 5
* [3] NextInstance 12
* [4] 1 1
-> (T) 7
* [1] Type 4
* [2] Start 5
* [3] ErrorControl 12
* [4] ImagePath 9
* [5] DisplayName 11
* [6] Group 5
* [7] DependOnService 15
-> system\currentcontrolset\services\DefragmentService"(R): 0
-> (T) 8
* [1] Type 4
* [2] Start 5
* [3] ErrorControl 12
* [4] ImagePath 9
* [5] DisplayName 11
* [6] WOW64 5
* [7] ObjectName 10
* [8] FailureActions 14
-> system\currentcontrolset\services\defragvc"(R): 0
-> system\currentcontrolset\services\defragvc\Parameters"(R): 1
-> (T) 1
* [1] ServiceDll 10
-> (T) 10
* [1] DisplayName 11
* [2] ImagePath 9
* [3] Description 11
* [4] ObjectName 10
* [5] ErrorControl 12
* [6] Start 5
* [7] Type 4
* [8] DependOnService 15
* [9] ServiceSidType 14
* [10] RequiredPrivileges 18
```


NewServiceWatch

```
[07-16-2017-19-58-17]-> WinDefend
[07-16-2017-19-58-17]-> WinHttpAutoProxySvc
[07-16-2017-19-58-17]-> Winmgmt
[07-16-2017-19-58-17]-> WinRM
[07-16-2017-19-58-17]-> WlanSvc
[07-16-2017-19-58-17]-> WLMS
[07-16-2017-19-58-17]-> WmiAcpi
[07-16-2017-19-58-17]-> WmiApSrv
[07-16-2017-19-58-17]-> WMPNetworkSvc
[07-16-2017-19-58-17]-> WPCSvc
[07-16-2017-19-58-17]-> WPDBusEnum
[07-16-2017-19-58-17]-> ws2ifs1
[07-16-2017-19-58-17]-> wscsv
[07-16-2017-19-58-17]-> WSearch
[07-16-2017-19-58-17]-> wuauclt
[07-16-2017-19-58-17]-> WudfPF
[07-16-2017-19-58-17]-> WudfSvc
[07-16-2017-19-58-17]-> WwanSvc

ONLY NEW SERVICES WILL SHOW ...
[07-16-2017-20-02-09]-> dcrypt
```


Services: dcrypt, DefragmentService

Dropped file dcrypt.exe (**DiskCryptor**) is responsible to encrypt the hardDisk.



Encryption:

Sector: 43601924 Total Sectors: 62910464




Done: 20.7 gb Estimated: 1 min., 30 sec.
Speed: 104.1 mb/sec. Elapsed: 7 min., 49 sec.

Symbolic Link \\?\Volume{8393a374-2faf-11e6-b25e-806e6f6e6963}
Device \Device\HarddiskVolume1

Cipher --
Encryption mode --
Pkcs5.2 prf --

LET'S LOOK AT THE MALICIOUS COMPONENTS:



All these files are used to encrypt the HDD, scan for network drives etc.

DCAPI.DLL

```
CreateMutexW (0x0, 0x0, u"DISKCRYPTOR_MUTEX");
static HANDLE = CreateMutex(NULL, FALSE, L"DISKCRYPTOR_MUTEX");
CreateFileW (u"\\.\dcrpt", 0x0, 0x0, 0x0);
a_keyfiles(dc_pass *pass, wchar_t *path)
mbr_sec = malloc(dg->BytesPerSector)
WriteFile(h_device, mbr_sec, dg->BytesPerSector, &bytes, NULL);
SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\dcrpt\config
dcrpt.sys
u"\\.\PhysicalDrive%d"
GetProcAddress (rax, "Format");
LoadLibrary( "fmifs.dll" );
Format = (void *) GetProcAddress(GetModuleHandle("fmifs.dll"),
```

DCCON.EXE

This binary is the console version of DiskCryptor. It requires a key and a parameter on command line. It can also wipe cached passwords from driver's memory and add password to the passwords cache, for auto mount reasons

```
rax = u"reboot system";
rcx = u"boot from active partition";
u"boot from unknown partition, id %0.8x"
u"boot from unknown partition, id %0.8x"
wprintf(u"Bootloader successfully removed from %s\n");
```

DCCON.EXE is a signed binary and is used to install the custom bootLoader (-setmbr). it uses the following values dc_dsk_get_size, c_format_byte_size, dc_get_mbr_config,

```
+++++ X ++++++
[0036FF14]-> <null>
[0036FF28]-> VeriSign Class 3 Code Signing 2010 CA
[0036FF2C]-> ReactOS Foundation
[0036FF18]-> <null>
[0036FF1C]-> <null>
[00FF2180]-> 0b 9e 9e d1 32 53 18 2a 96 07 81 90 43 67 cc 0f
```


```
L"0 - On/Off passwords caching (%s)\n"  
L"1 - On/Off hiding $dcsys$ files (%s)\n"  
L"2 - On/Off hardware cryptography support (%s)\n"  
L"3 - On/Off automounting at boot time (%s)\n"  
L"4 - On/Off optimization for SSD disks (%s)\n"  
L"5 - On/Off disable TRIM on encrypted SSD disks (%s)\n"  
L"-----\n"  
L"6 - On/Off Deny access to unencrypted removable devices (%s)\n"  
L"7 - On/Off Deny access to unencrypted HDD's (%s)\n"  
L"8 - On/Off Deny access to unencrypted CDROM (%s)\n"  
L"-----\n"  
L"9 - Save changes and exit\n\n",
```

MOUNT.EXE

Mainly used to enumerate mounted drives. It scans network drives and encrypts them. It creates two files i.e. netpass.txt and netuse.txt for storing the passwords and log messages

```
CreateFileA("C:\\DC22\\netpass.txt", 0x80000000, 0x1, 0x0, 0x3, 0x0, 0x0);  
CreateFileA("C:\\DC22\\netuse.txt", 0x80000000, 0x1, 0x0, 0x3, 0x0, 0x0);
```

```
installing driver...  
installing driver successfully..  
getting share drive information...  
Trying to create service...  
creating service successfully. rebooting windows...
```



```

mov     ecx, 0x42b698             ; "mount:start"
sub_foo
mov     ecx, 0x42b6a8             ; "pass:"
call   sub_foo

call   dword [ds:imp_MultiByteToWideChar] // MultiByteToWideChar()
mov     ecx, 0x42b6b0             ; "mount:start encrypting share drives"

```

NETPASS.exe is used to retrieve network passwords stored in the system. This information is saved in a text file shown above netpass.txt. On the other hand netuse.txt will have all the network share information.

DCRYPT.SYS is the *DiskCryptor* driver

```

static const struct {
    int         i_count;
    const char* password;
    const char* salt;
    int         dklen;
    const char* key;
} pkcs5_vectors[] = {
    { 5, "password", "\x12\x34\x56\x78", 4, "\x13\x64\xae\xfb" },
    { 5, "password", "\x12\x34\x56\x78", 144, "\x13\x64\xae\xfb\x0d\xf5\x57\x6c\x30\xd5\x71\x4c\xa7\x75\x3f"
      "\xfd\x00\xe5\x25\x8b\x39\xc7\x44\x7f\xce\x23\x3d\x08\x75\xe0"
      "\x2f\xa8\xd6\x30\xd7\xe0\xb6\x24\xdb\xe0\x5a\xd7\x47\xef\x52"
      "\xca\xa6\x34\x83\x47\xe5\xcb\xe9\x87\xf1\x20\x59\x6a\xe6\xa9"
      "\xcf\x51\x78\xc6\xb6\x23\xa6\x74\x0d\xe8\x91\xbe\x1a\xd0\x28"
      "\xcc\xce\x16\x98\x9a\xbe\xfb\xdc\x78\xc9\xe1\x7d\x72\x67\xce"
      "\xe1\x61\x56\x5f\x96\x68\xe6\xe1\xdd\xf4\xbf\x1b\x80\xe0\x19"
      "\x1c\xf4\xc4\xd3\xdd\xd5\xd5\x57\x2d\x83\xc7\xa3\x37\x87\xf4"
      "\x4e\xe0\xf6\xd8\x6d\x65\xdc\xa0\x52\xa3\x13\xbe\x81\xfc\x30"
      "\xbe\x7d\x69\x58\x34\xb6\xdd\x41\xc6" }
};

```

It uses the following encryption types

```

{ CF_AES,                0xd5faad12, 0xf78e1ee6 },
{ CF_TWOFISH,            0x63f53fab, 0xf0bf3fe2 },
{ CF_SERPENT,            0xc63098ff, 0xa27615ad },
{ CF_AES_TWOFISH,        0xeb80c77a, 0x05c1f39c },
{ CF_TWOFISH_SERPENT,    0x1f5b5c3a, 0x533b76ca },
{ CF_SERPENT_AES,        0x1604a6b2, 0x637378c7 },
{ CF_AES_TWOFISH_SERPENT, 0x48deea37, 0x02b2a064 }

```

DCINST.EXE is used to install or update the driver and uses the following options

- setup // install or update driver (update bootloader when needed)
- unins // uninstall driver
- unldr // uninstall bootloader
- isenc // check for boot device encryption
- isboot // check for bootloader on boot device

For encryption AES algorithm is used:

```
0x52000000, 0x90000000, 0x6a000000, 0xd5000000, 0x30000000, 0x36000000, 0xa5000000, 0x38000000,
0xbf000000, 0x40000000, 0xa3000000, 0x9e000000, 0x81000000, 0xf3000000, 0xd7000000, 0xfb000000,
0x7c000000, 0xe3000000, 0x39000000, 0x82000000, 0x9b000000, 0x2f000000, 0xff000000, 0x87000000,
0x34000000, 0x8e000000, 0x43000000, 0x44000000, 0xc4000000, 0xde000000, 0xe9000000, 0xcb000000,
0x54000000, 0x7b000000, 0x94000000, 0x32000000, 0xa6000000, 0xc2000000, 0x23000000, 0x3d000000,
0xee000000, 0x4c000000, 0x95000000, 0xb0000000, 0x42000000, 0xfa000000, 0xc3000000, 0x4e000000,
0x08000000, 0x2e000000, 0xa1000000, 0x66000000, 0x28000000, 0xd9000000, 0x24000000, 0xb2000000,
0x76000000, 0x5b000000, 0xa2000000, 0x49000000, 0x6d000000, 0x8b000000, 0xd1000000, 0x25000000,
0x72000000, 0xf8000000, 0xf6000000, 0x64000000, 0x86000000, 0x68000000, 0x98000000, 0x16000000,
0xd4000000, 0xa4000000, 0x5c000000, 0xcc000000, 0x5d000000, 0x65000000, 0xb6000000, 0x92000000,
0x6c000000, 0x70000000, 0x48000000, 0x50000000, 0xfd000000, 0xed000000, 0xb9000000, 0xda000000,
0x5e000000, 0x15000000, 0x46000000, 0x57000000, 0xa7000000, 0x8d000000, 0x9d000000, 0x84000000,
0x90000000, 0xd8000000, 0xab000000, 0x00000000, 0x8c000000, 0xbc000000, 0xd3000000, 0xa0000000,
0xf7000000, 0xe4000000, 0x58000000, 0x05000000, 0xb8000000, 0xb3000000, 0x45000000, 0x06000000,
0xd0000000, 0x2c000000, 0x1e000000, 0x8f000000, 0xca000000, 0x3f000000, 0x0f000000, 0x20000000,
0xc1000000, 0xaf000000, 0xbd000000, 0x03000000, 0x01000000, 0x13000000, 0x8a000000, 0x6b000000,
0x3a000000, 0x91000000, 0x11000000, 0x41000000, 0x4f000000, 0x67000000, 0xdc000000, 0xea000000,
0x97000000, 0xf2000000, 0xcf000000, 0xce000000, 0xf0000000, 0xb4000000, 0xe6000000, 0x73000000,
0x96000000, 0xac000000, 0x74000000, 0x22000000, 0xe7000000, 0xad000000, 0x35000000, 0x85000000,
0xe2000000, 0xf9000000, 0x37000000, 0xe8000000, 0x1c000000, 0x75000000, 0xdf000000, 0x6e000000,
0x47000000, 0xf1000000, 0x1a000000, 0x71000000, 0x1d000000, 0x29000000, 0xc5000000, 0x89000000,
0x6f000000, 0xb7000000, 0x62000000, 0x0e000000, 0xaa000000, 0x18000000, 0xbe000000, 0x1b000000,
0xfc000000, 0x56000000, 0x3e000000, 0x4b000000, 0xc6000000, 0xd2000000, 0x79000000, 0x20000000,
0x9a000000, 0xdb000000, 0xc0000000, 0xf0000000, 0x78000000, 0xcd000000, 0x5a000000, 0xf4000000,
0x1f000000, 0xdd000000, 0xa8000000, 0x33000000, 0x88000000, 0x07000000, 0xc7000000, 0x31000000,
0xb1000000, 0x10000000, 0x1a000000, 0x59000000, 0x27000000, 0x80000000, 0xec000000, 0x5f000000,
0x60000000, 0x51000000, 0x7f000000, 0xa9000000, 0x19000000, 0xb5000000, 0x4a000000, 0x0d000000,
0x2d000000, 0xe5000000, 0x7a000000, 0x9f000000, 0x93000000, 0xc9000000, 0x9c000000, 0xef000000,
0xa0000000, 0xe0000000, 0x3b000000, 0x4d000000, 0xae000000, 0x2a000000, 0xf5000000, 0xb0000000,
0xc8000000, 0xeb000000, 0xbb000000, 0x3c000000, 0x83000000, 0x53000000, 0x99000000, 0x61000000,
0x17000000, 0x2b000000, 0x04000000, 0x7e000000, 0xba000000, 0x77000000, 0xd6000000, 0x26000000,
0xe1000000, 0x69000000, 0x14000000, 0x63000000, 0x55000000, 0x21000000, 0x0c000000, 0x7d000000,
```



```
void _stdcall aes256_set_key(const unsigned char *key, aes256_key *skey)
{
    unsigned long *ek, *dk;
    int j, i;
    unsigned long t, rcon;

    ek = skey->enc_key;
    i = 7; rcon = 1;

    memcpy(ek, key, AES_KEY_SIZE);
    do
    {
        ek[ 8] = ek[0] ^ key_mix(ek[7]) ^ rcon;
        ek[ 9] = ek[1] ^ ek[ 8];
        ek[10] = ek[2] ^ ek[ 9];
        ek[11] = ek[3] ^ ek[10];
    }
```

Payload maintains the log as well.

```
Checking resources existence. They are OK...
copy resource file...
driver installed before...
installing driver...
installing driver successfully..
failed to copy file and exit..
Password not set.exit
C:\DC22\netpass.txt
getting share drive information...
schtasks /create /tn DefragmentService /TR "cmd.exe /c net use >> c:\dc22\netuse.txt" /sc DAILY
schtasks /run /TN DefragmentService
schtasks /delete /TN DefragmentService /F
C:\DC22\netpass.exe /stab C:\DC22\netpass.txt
net user /add mythbusters 123456
net localgroup administrators mythbusters /add
cmd /c net use >> c:\dc22\netuse.txt
Trying to create service...
creating service successfully. rebooting windows...
starting serviceMain...
ServiceMain: Entry
ServiceMain: RegisterServiceCtrlHandler returned error
ServiceMain: SetServiceStatus returned error
ServiceMain: Performing Service Start Operations
ServiceMain: CreateEvent(g_ServiceStopEvent) returned error
ServiceMain: SetServiceStatus returned error

ServiceMain: Waiting for Worker Thread to complete
ServiceMain: Worker Thread Stop Event signaled
ServiceMain: Performing Cleanup Operations
ServiceMain: Exit
ServiceCtrlHandler: Entry
ServiceCtrlHandler: SERVICE_CONTROL_STOP Request
ServiceCtrlHandler: SetServiceStatus returned error
ServiceCtrlHandler: Exit
ServiceWorkerThread: Entry
Starting Mount app...
C:\DC22\Mount.exe
open
LogonUserW_FAILURE
PXERR_IMPERSONATION_FAILURE
start hard drive encryption...
time limit passed,doing clean-up and reboot...
/C ping 1.1.1.1 -n 1 -w 3000 > Nul & sc delete DefragmentService & Del "
& taskkill /im Mount.exe & Del "C:\DC22\Mount.exe" & Del "C:\DC22\netpass.txt" & Del "C:\DC22\netuse.txt" & Del "C:\DC22\netpass.exe" & net user /del mythbusters
& shutdown /f /r /t 0
```

CONCLUSION

It's a pretty complex piece of ransomware that requires escalated privileges, which could be obtained in multiple ways. Recently we have seen OS level exploits in action. Make sure your systems are patched. Use of a good end-point solution is necessary. Last but not least hire good security folks.
